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Abstract It is likely that ten years of economic crisis have eroded the support of
democracy in Europe. But how much? The existing research is divided on this is-
sue. Some claim that the degree of satisfaction with democracy has declined across
the whole of Europe during the Great Recession. Other researchers have found
no empirical evidence that the support of democracy as a core value has declined
across Europe. They claim that merely the specific support has decreased in some
countries. This article will use the data from the European Social Survey to verify
both claims. It shows that the Great Recession did not lead to a legitimacy crisis
of European democracies and that the diffuse support of democracy remains high
in most regions. The degree to which the specific support of democracy has been
weakened is moderated by the type of welfare regime. In countries where the eco-
nomic crisis did strike hard and the welfare state is weakly developed, the support
of democracy has dropped dramatically. This outcome takes a middle position be-
tween two extremes in the ongoing academic debate on the support of democracy.
Both positions regarding the increase or decrease of support of and satisfaction with
democracy are in need of more nuance by taking into account the impact of welfare
regimes. Existing research often assumes a uniform European context that shows
either increasing or decreasing levels of satisfaction with democracy. Our research
has shown that the response of citizens to the Great Recession has been influenced
by the welfare regime.
The Appendix includes descriptive analyses of the variations in satisfaction with democracy within
the regions, trust by level of education, trends in trust and satisfaction with government and
democracy, variations in poverty and income inequality.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s12286-017-
0337-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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Wann und wo hat die große Rezession die Unterstützung der
Demokratie unterminiert?
Zusammenfassung Vermutlich haben zehn Jahre Wirtschaftskrise zu einer Ver-
ringerung der Unterstützung der Demokratie in Europa geführt. Aber wie stark?
Bestehende Forschungsergebnisse treffen diesbezüglich widersprüchliche Aussagen.
Während manche Forscher einen Rückgang der Zufriedenheit mit der Demokratie
in ganz Europa während der großen Rezession konstatieren, finden andere keine
empirischen Belege für eine Abnahme des zentralen Werts der Unterstützung der
Demokratie in Europa. Vielmehr gehen letztere davon aus, dass lediglich die spezifi-
sche Unterstützung in manchen Ländern abgenommen hat. Diese beiden Annahmen
werden in diesem Artikel auf der Grundlage von Daten des European Social Survey
untersucht. Es zeigt sich, dass die große Rezession nicht zu einer Legitimitätskrise
europäischer Demokratien geführt hat und dass die diffuse Unterstützung der De-
mokratie in den meisten Regionen konstant hoch geblieben ist. Das Ausmaß in dem
die spezifische Unterstützung der Demokratie zurückgegangen ist, wird durch den
jeweiligen Wohlfahrtsstaatstyp beeinflusst. In Ländern, die von der Wirtschaftskrise
stark betroffen waren und wo der Wohlfahrtsstaat schwach ausgeprägt ist, hat die
Unterstützung der Demokratie dramatisch nachgelassen. Dieses Ergebnis nimmt eine
mittlere Position zwischen den beiden Extrempositionen der gegenwärtigen wissen-
schaftlichen Debatte über die Unterstützung der Demokratie ein. Beide Positionen
zur Zu- oder Abnahme der Unterstützung und Zufriedenheit mit der Demokratie
sollten differenzierter ausgearbeitet werden, indem sie den Einfluß des Wohlfahrts-
staatsregimes mit in Betracht ziehen. Die bisherige Forschung unterstellt oftmals
einen einheitlichen europäischen Kontext, welcher entweder zu- oder abnehmende
Zufriedenheit mit der Demokratie aufweist. Unsere Analyse zeigt jedoch, dass die
Reaktionen der Bürger auf die große Rezession durch das Wohlfahrtsstaatsregime
beeinflußt wurden.
Schlüsselwörter Demokratie · Wirtschaftskrise · Europa · Wohlfahrtsstaat ·
Umfragedaten · Quantitative Methoden
1 Introduction
During the last decennium many articles have been published that examine the
linkage between the prolonged economic crisis within the Eurozone after 2007
(“Great Recession”) and the support of and satisfaction with democracy. In many
Western countries the crisis involved two or more consecutive quarters of GDP
contraction resulting into ongoing hardship as a result of austerity programs and
growing unemployment. Often, the tone was quite cumbersome: it was signalled that
satisfaction with government and democracy was declining and that even the support
of democracy as a political system was weakening. After ten years of economic crisis
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we may ask to which extent this pessimistic conclusion is (still) justified given the
most recent available data.
The Great Recession has had not only financial and economic consequences, but
also political ones. It has weakened the problem-solving capacity of democratic sys-
tems which increased dissatisfaction with politics and performance and the trust in
politicians in many established democracies. Examples are the Southern European
democracies which have been hit hard by this crisis (according to the Economic Cri-
sis Index which is calculated as: GDP Growth – Unemployment + Deficit-Surplus,
see Kriesi 2013), but also a number of Eastern European countries like Hungary
in which voters are increasingly dissatisfied with the functioning of party democ-
racy. In other countries, the support for democracy has not changed, like in Sweden
and Germany. These variations within Europe underline the importance of taking
into account the national and regional context that impacts on the type and degree
of dissatisfaction. Particularly important are the different types welfare regimes of
these regions that may strengthen of weaken the effects of the economic crisis on
the support of democracy. By focusing on the moderating effect of welfare states
on the support of democracy, this research distinguishes itself from most other work
on this topic that neglects the role of welfare regimes. The Great Recession urges
for insights into the recent developments in the satisfaction with democracy and the
trust in politics and politicians. Does the Great Recession gradually undermine the
support of democracy among certain groups in the electorate? In the literature we
find different answers to this question. Since these findings are conflicting they are
in need of a reconsideration now that the Great Recession has lasted for ten years:
to which degree did it erode satisfaction with democracy in different welfare state
regimes in Europe? The research seeks to answer this question by analysing the
degree of satisfaction with democracy and government on the basis of data of the
European Social Survey (ESS). The results show a mixed situation in which there
is an increase in some countries and a decrease in other countries. There is a sys-
tematic correspondence between the level of support of democracy and the type of
welfare regime. The variation in welfare regimes is relevant for the degree to which
the Great Recession erodes the support of democracy.
One of the main reasons that the literature arrives at different conclusions regard-
ing the support of democracy is that different research designs have been used. The
choices which are made in the research design (such as the case selection, type of
data, data sources, time period, operationalisation) and the theoretical and norma-
tive propositions all have an impact on the findings. In order to limit the chance of
biased results, our research design includes ample variation in the dependent and
independent variables, selects all relevant cases and uses data on several aspects of
democratic support that enable both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal analysis of
the patterned variations.
2 Theories and assumptions
What is support of democracy? In this research we focus on the effects of the
economic crisis on the democratic legitimacy of European democracies. There is
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a formal and informal aspect of the support of democracy. The distinction between
“formal support” and “informal support” is needed in order to explain why there is
variation in support for democracy in countries that are equally democratic (from
a formal point of view). The formal definitions refer to ‘rightfulness’ of the legal
exercise of public authority. Such legitimate exercise of political power is bound
to several criteria (Beetham 1994). First, power should be exercised within a set of
established responsive and accountable institutions that help to arrive at an agreement
in case of conflicting ideas or interests. Second, institutionalized power must be open
for control and correction by means of the Rule of Law and forms of checks and
balances. These rules and mechanisms secure the political and civil liberties of the
individual and of minority groups (Stone Sweet 2008).
The informal definitions emphasize the importance of consent of the people for
legitimacy, also called ‘willing obedience’ (Levi et al. 2009, p. 355). Consent does
not necessarily mean agreement, but more importantly the willingness to accept
decisions and to use the channels offered by the democratic system to express
(dis)content, for example by means of voting or protesting. Since support of democ-
racy is based on consent of the people, it is not static but may change over time as
a response to the varying economic and social performance of governments. A de-
cline of support of democracy may lead to instability of a political system due to
decreasing trust and support. This may have far reaching consequences for the ways
in which elites and masses interact. If authority is accepted by citizens as just there
is no need for much coercion. Instead there is compliance with public regulation and
enacted governmental policies in a non-coercive authoritative manner. This enables
the government to steer economy and society without much force (Beetham 2013).
Since support of democracy is multi-facetted, most definitions put a different
emphasis on the formal and informal aspects. Some emphasize the formalized pro-
cedures to safeguard liberties and constraining public contestation, others tend to
stress the need of popular participation and (fair) representation of interests and
regions. Beetham (2013), for example, argues that an authority is considered legit-
imate if its exercise of power is established and exercised in accordance with legal
rules, justified by shared beliefs of the population, and acquired through the consent
of citizens.
Legitimacy is mainly found in (liberal) democracies which are characterized by
the rule of law and civil and political rights of the individual (Dahl 1989). This
is the formal situation. In practice there may be ample variation in the degree of
legitimacy between these countries due to different degrees of popular acceptance
and consent with the political regime. This variation implies that perceptions and
trust are important for the evaluation of the legitimacy of democratic systems. If
citizens are disappointed or disagree with policy outcomes, but at the same time feel
that the elites and institutions are functioning well, discontent will not undermine
the legitimacy of the system (Levi et al. 2009). Often this situation is more complex
than either being supportive or not supportive of the democratic system. If large parts
of the population do support the system, but hardly participate, there is a legitimacy
problem. If there is support, this should be expressed by political behaviour like
voting. If there is discontent, like during an economic crisis, this should activate
citizens to protest against the austerity policies. If there is an increase in disaffection
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and this is translated into protest, the legitimacy will be less affected then when
disaffection goes hand in hand with apathy and lack of interest. These different
ways of expressing support imply that the impact of the economic crisis on the
legitimacy of advanced democracies in Europe may vary. It may be at danger in
particular regions or countries, but it may also remain largely unaffected by the
crisis in other countries (Hernández and Kriesi 2016). It is not only the impact of
the crisis itself that matters, but also the behaviour of international actors (such as
international financial institutions and the EU) and of national actors (such as parties
and interest groups) and the institutional infrastructure (such as the type of welfare
regime) that affect the capacity of governments to cope with the economic crisis.
It is not obvious how to conceptualize the consent of the people. Often it is
conceptualized as support of the democratic system and the government. Easton
(1975) has made the distinction between specific and diffuse support of democracy.
Specific support refers to the support and evaluations of the perceived decisions,
policies and actions of actors and institutions. Diffuse support refers to a more
common feeling of ‘generalized attachment’ to the democratic regime (Easton 1975,
p. 444). Specific support relies on the evaluations of particular institutions, parties or
leaders and the perceived performance of policies. It is based on a rational calculation
of costs and benefits that are derived from evaluations of performance. Diffuse
support, on the other hand, is the firm belief and trust of citizens that the democratic
institutions are put in place on their behalf and are basically part of their way of
living. Whereas specific support is inherently volatile, diffuse support is more stable
as its determinants are related to political values and attachments. Diffuse support
is important for the stability of democratic systems because it helps citizens to
accept decisions to which they are opposed (Easton 1975). This does not mean that
diffuse support will remain stable in all circumstances. It may change due to sudden
shocks, a deep crisis or continuous malfunctioning of the system (indicated by
stalemates, cabinet crises, polarisation etc.). The economic crisis starting in 2008 is
certainly a development that might have shocked both specific and diffuse support of
national democracies. The degree of economic misery matters for citizens’ trust and
evaluations of actors and institutions (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). More misery
often implies more dissatisfaction which may (ultimately) affect legitimacy. Many
researchers have shown that people in democratic regimes tend to support democracy
when governmental performance is good (Magalhães 2014; Keman 2014). The core
argument is that discontent with the way the regime works and/or its policy outcomes
erodes the citizens’ support of it (Pharr and Putnam 2000). Thus, frustration with
government performance and/or an economic recession can affect the core support
of democracy (Cordero and Simón 2016).
2.1 Hypotheses
Since specific support is closely linked to government performance, it is likely that
this type of support is most affected by the economic crisis (H1). The diffuse support
is expected to be less affected because the non-democratic alternatives for democratic
regimes are by most citizens perceived to perform much worse than democratic
systems given the circumstances (as is argued by Easton’s theory of political support
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(Easton 1975) (H2)). Diffuse support is mainly affected in countries where the crisis
did strike relatively hard (indicated by the Economic Crisis Index = GDP Growth –
Unemployment + Deficit-Surplus, see Kriesi 2013, p. 307) and where governments
imposed far-reaching restrictive policies that meet strong resistance among interest
groups and the population at large.
In addition to support of democracy, the trust in politics and politicians is impor-
tant, i. e. the belief that political authorities and institutions do not seek to benefit
themselves but produce outcomes that benefit large parts of the population (Newton
2008; Sztompka 1999). The concept of political trust is multi-facetted. It can be di-
vided into forms like thick, interpersonal, and systemic or institutional trust (Newton
2008). Given these diverse forms of trust there is overlap with the concepts of spe-
cific support and diffuse support. The main commonality is that trust links ordinary
citizens to institutions that represent them (Fagerland Kroknes et al. 2015). If citi-
zens trust these institutions this will enhance both the legitimacy and the perceived
effectiveness of democratic government. Both political trust and diffuse support are
essential for the stability of democracy and both are a basic prerequisite for the
legitimacy of those being in power. If trust in political authorities and institutions
is declining this may endanger their legitimacy since low levels of trust hamper the
government to perform its tasks because citizens are less likely to obey the law or to
accept decisions. Some degree of distrust towards political authority is healthy for
democracy because it puts a pressure on elites to perform better (Sztompka 1999;
Nye 1997). However, an extended period of distrust could have negative conse-
quences, especially if the reason for distrust is corruption. The trustworthiness of
political authorities is important for the legitimacy of elites because the democratic
process of representation assumes that people trust that political authorities are hon-
est and not corrupt and that they will deliver on their promises (Beetham 2013).
Economic prosperity has been identified as especially important in this regard be-
cause it signals the degree to which elites do deliver as promised (Keman 2014).
The more the economic crisis has had a negative impact on people’s lives, the more
they may lose trust in their national parliament, which happened most pronounced
in Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Roth et al. 2011). In order to assess the
impact of the crisis on citizens we need to take into account the socio-economic
differences, in particular education. The higher educated will remain more satisfied
and will keep more institutional trust than the lower educated (Schäfer 2013). We
hypothesise that the Great Recession will lead to lower levels of trust, in particular
of the lower educated and in countries with that are hit hard by the crisis (H3).
Some research has signalled an increase in dissatisfaction and a decline in politi-
cal trust (e. g. Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). There
is one important exception. If austerity measures are imposed on governments by
external actors like the EU and the IMF, governments have far less room to manoeu-
vre to cope with the crisis. In that case the blame is likely not on the government
but on the external actors. We hypothesize that countries in which austerity mea-
sures are imposed by external actors the support of the national system may increase
(H4). This statement is not supported by all researchers. Some authors agree that the
support of democracy is gradually weakened, but this trend is unrelated to the Great
Recession because politics itself is becoming more and more discredited due to the
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acceptance of neo-liberal ideas by both parties and voters that do not regard the state
as competent problem-solver (Hay 2002). Other researchers state that democracy is
not at stake at all because parties succeed in fulfilling their functions in ways that
congruent with the median voter (Budge et al. 2012; Sanders et al. 2014; Dalton
et al. 2011). Finally, a group of researchers arrives at a more nuanced conclusion
that the trends are not uni-directional. The cross-national and longitudinal varia-
tions show examples of both rising and declining satisfaction with governments and
democracy (Norris 2011; Thomassen 2015). According to them there is no systemic
decline in the degree of satisfaction with democracy, neither before, during or after
the economic crisis. On average the levels of satisfaction remain at a high level.
There has been a long-standing debate in the academic literature on the different
types of welfare regimes in Europe and beyond. Although there is no consensus
on these types, it is generally accepted that most countries in the main regions of
Europe have similar welfare state regimes. This is reflected in the names which are
being given to these clusters, like Nordic welfare states, Southern welfare states,
East European welfare regimes etcetera (see for an overview of the debate on wel-
fare regime differences: Arts and Gelissen 2002). These countries resemble each
other in the degree of universalism, egalitarianism and de-commodification (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Countries belonging to the same welfare regime have in common
that they provide a similar type and degree of welfare to citizens. These differences
matter for the degree of social inequality and the support of democracy since the
more social protection is provided, the less threatening are the effects of the eco-
nomic recession (Albano and Barbera 2010). The more gentler and kinder a society
is regulated and the more welfare and well-being is achieved, the more legitimate
governance is expected to be.
We do not stand alone in making this causal claim. In the literature on welfare
states it has often been argued that the rise of social provisions and services in-
tends to compensate for the risks and inequalities that are involved in capitalism
(Van Kersbergen and Manow 2014). Moderate levels of inequality are necessary
for democracy to thrive. Democracy and the welfare state have become intertwined.
Most established democracies are also advanced welfare states. Citizens living in
welfare states wholeheartedly support democracy because it offers the conditions for
safeguarding the level of social welfare and income, especially in times of economic
crisis. Now that economic growth has slowed down or even halted or decreased, we
expect that this has affected the satisfaction with democracy. It is assumed that dis-
satisfaction with democracy is growing relative fast in countries that are hit hard by
the crisis and in which the welfare states cannot compensate for that. Dissatisfaction
will not increase in countries that are hit less hard by the crisis and/or in which the
welfare state is able to provide sufficient levels of welfare, work and income for all
social groups despite the Great Recession.
Legitimacy is thus systematically related to the variations in socio economic per-
formance and the type of welfare state. Most countries with similar welfare states
have similar levels of social and economic welfare, cultural heritage and traditions
and phase of democratic development (Bodor et al. 2014). The vast amount of liter-
ature of welfare state classifications provides an excellent source of the main socio-
economic similarities and differences between these regimes (see for an overview:
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Arts and Gelissen 2002). These characteristics may make countries more or less
vulnerable to the effects of the Great Recession. The Nordic countries are expected
to have the highest developed welfare regimes and levels of socio-economic welfare
and are least affected by the crisis. The Southern countries are expected to have
an intermediate level of collective welfare provisions and are strongly affected by
the crisis. The Eastern countries have the lowest level of socio-economic welfare,
but the degree to which they are affected by the crisis varies (see for an overview:
Honkapohja and Korhonen 2013). The continental countries have intermediate lev-
els of socio-economic welfare and most of them are modestly affected by the crisis.
Finally the two countries with liberal welfare regimes (the UK and Ireland) have
been hit relatively hard by the crisis (Kriesi 2013). We hypothesise that the type
of welfare state and socio-economic performance have a moderating effect on the
degree to which citizens satisfied with democracy during the Great Recession (H5).
This does not mean that the welfare regime approach offers the only explanation
of the support of democracy. Alternative explanations do exist like those that stress
the impact of austerity policies by the EU, the IMF and the ECB (e. g. Armingeon
and Guthmann 2014; Armingeon et al. 2016; Cordero and Simón 2016). In addition
there are approaches that stress the individual-level variation within welfare states
(see for an overview of this argument: Kumlin 2002). These alternative explanations
will be examined by incorporating the most relevant indicators into the analysis
(namely whether a country is bailed out and EMU-membership).
3 Data and operationalisation
We divide Europe into five regions that each have similar welfare regimes: Nordic,
Continental, South, East and Anglo-Saxon (Ferrera 1996).1 There is a longstanding
ongoing debate on the proper operationalization of welfare state regimes. It started
with Esping-Andersen who introduced three types of welfare states consisting of
Social Democratic, Conservative and Liberal regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). In
his typology Italy is part of the family of the corporatist welfare state regimes,
whereas Spain, Portugal and Greece are not included in the analysis. This has
been criticized by many authors who have pointed at the clientelistic character of
the Southern regimes (Arts and Gelissen 2002). According to many commentators
Southern European countries form a separate cluster of welfare regimes (Ferrera
1996; Bonoli 1997). A similar argument also applies to Eastern Europe. This cluster
is not included in Esping-Andersen’s typology, whereas according to many observers
these countries form a distinctive cluster that does not fall into this trilogy (Aidukaite
2009; Kaariainen and Lehtonen 2006). The East European or post-communist regime
has similarities with both the liberal and conservative corporatist welfare regimes
1 The countries are part of five regions which are Scandinavia (Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden), An-
glo-Saxon Europe (Ireland, United Kingdom), Continental Europe (Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands,
France, Germany), Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy) and Eastern Europe (Estonia, Slovenia, Slo-
vakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland). Excluded are the smallest countries (Iceland, Cyprus,
Luxembourg) and the most peripheral countries (Turkey, Ukraine). Greece is part of the longitudinal anal-
ysis, but not of the cross sectional analysis because it did not participate in the sixth wave of the ESS.
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as well as some distinct post-communist feature such as a high take-up rate of
social security but relatively low benefit levels; the identification of the social policy
system with the Soviet past, and a low level of people’s trust in the state institutions
(Aidukaite 2009). Thus, it could be argued that although the East European region is
very diverse, it has similar macro-level institutional an cultural features that justify
the clustering of these countries into the ideal type post-communist regime.
Since support of democracy is multi-facetted, it is measured by a variety of
indicators. Norris (2011) has distinguished five levels of political support with ac-
companying empirical indicators. We will focus on four of them, namely regime
principles (democracy better than any other form of government), regime perfor-
mance (satisfaction with the functioning of democracy), political institutions (trust
in political institutions) and political authorities (e. g. satisfaction with incumbent
government).
To find out whether the crisis has weakened satisfaction and support, we need
information on the longitudinal variations in order to cross-validate the cross-sec-
tional analysis. Since many empirical studies contradict each other on the degree
to which there is a decreasing support of and trust in democracy and government
(Hurrelman et al. 2005) it is important to adopt an inclusive research design with
ample variation between countries and time periods. The required data are available
in the European Social Survey (ESS) which includes questions on the satisfaction
with democracy and government. Some governments are better able to deal with the
economic crisis than others. This variation can help to understand why the Great
Recession has different effects on satisfaction of citizens living in European welfare
regimes.
Specific support is operationalized by means of two indicators: the degree of
satisfaction with democracy (stfdem) and the degree of satisfaction with government
(stfgov). These are indicators of the degree of satisfaction of citizens with the way
democracy works and how the government is doing its job at the moment of the
Survey. Satisfaction with government is a relevant indicator since legitimacy is
affected by the goals and achievements of the government (Keman 2014; Beetham
2013).
The diffuse support is operationalised by institutional trust which is measured by
the mean of the values on three variables: Trust in Parliament, Trust in the legal
system and trust in the police. These institutions represent the rule of law and the
democratic representation of the will of the people. Trust is the second indicator
for diffuse support as existing research has shown that it is both conceptually and
empirically strongly related to the structural support for democracy as a systemic
feature of the political system in which citizens live (Kumlin 2002).
Although the indicators for specific and diffuse support have been criticized
because they do not mean exactly the same across countries and social groups
(Ferrín and Kriesi 2016), existing research shows that they are distinct concepts
that do relate to the more specific (or ad hoc) and the more systemic aspects of the
functioning of democracies (e. g. van Van Beek 2010; Norris 2011).
Fig. 1 shows the relationship between the change in GDP per capita (Worldbank,
2007–2015) and the change in the support of democracy (ESS, 2006–2012). The
pattern shows a modest positive relationship between the two variables (r = 0.541,
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Fig. 1 Change in satisfaction
with democracy explained by
change in GDP per capita
p = 0.009, n = 22). Most countries enjoying a growth in GDP also show a growth in
the support of democracy. Most countries that are confronted with a decline in GDP
can be divided into two groups. In one group this decline coincides with a decline in
the support of democracy (Italy, Spain. Portugal, Slovenia, Ireland). Several of these
countries have been hit hard by the crisis and have been bailed out. In the other group
there is no decline in the support of democracy despite a decline in GDP. The plot
also shows whether countries are clustered regarding their belonging to a particular
welfare state regime. Such clusters do exist as most countries belonging to the same
regime are positioned in the same quadrant. The plot shows a continental cluster
(Switzerland is the only exception due to its high GDP-growth), a Nordic cluster,
an Eastern cluster (Slovenia is the only exception due to its decline in GDP). The
three Southern countries which are included in the respective ESS-rounds also fall
into the same quadrant. The plot confirms the basic assumption made earlier that
the impact of economic growth on the support for democracy is shaped by the type
of welfare regime.
4 Trends and cross-sectional variations
One major claim made in some recent research articles is that “Support for national
democracy” – operationalised as satisfaction with the way democracy works and
as trust in parliament – declined dramatically during the crisis (Armingeon and
Guthmann 2014). However, other scolars argue that there is no such trend towards
less satisfaction with democracy across the whole of Europe (Thomassen 2015).
In addition they argue that dissatisfaction is not necessarily related to economic
problems. It can also be a sign of increasing emancipation of critical citizens which
one would expect in the most advanced democracies (Norris 2011).
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Table 1 The percentage of citizens that is satisfied on five indicators related to support of democracy
Specific support Diffuse support
Satisfied with democracy Satisfied with government Institutional Trust
2012 2006 Change 2012 2006 Change 2012 2006 Change
Nordic 0.70 0.82 0.12 0.70 0.71 0.01 0.80 0.83 0.03
Liberal 0.46 0.53 0.07 0.46 0.44 –0.01 0.51 0.59 0.08
Continental 0.45 0.59 0.14 0.45 0.55 0.10 0.58 0.62 0.05
Southern 0.56 0.27 –0.29 0.56 0.25 –0.32 0.52 0.39 –0.13
Eastern 0.29 0.37 0.08 0.29 0.34 0.06 0.26 0.28 0.01














The values are differences in averages of being either satisfied (scored 1) or dissatisfied (scored 0) between
the years 2006 and 2012. The distinction between satisfied and dissatisfied is based on the median score.
The F-score is based on the aggregated scores at the country-level and indicates the ratio between the
within-group variation and between-group variation. i.e. how diverse the countries within the regions are.
All variables (except “Institutional Trust”) are ordinal and range on a scale from 1 to 10. The measurement
level of Trust is interval and ranges from 0 (no trust) to 10 (complete trust). The cases are weighted by the
design weights (DWEIGHT) and the population size weights (PWEIGHT) in the ESS data. Appendix 1
includes additional information on the within and between country variation (ANOVA analyses)
The explorative analysis focuses on the cross-sectional variations in the dependent
variable, i. e. specific and diffuse support. The goal of this analysis is to find out
whether regions with different welfare regimes are characterised by different levels
of support for democracy. Since there may be differences between the countries per
region, another goal of the analysis is to determine the within-region and between-
region variation. If the between-region differences are much stronger than the within-
region differences this supports our argument that regional differences matter due to
different welfare regimes. This is reflected by the F-score in Table 1 which is based
on the aggregated scores at the country-level and indicates the ratio between the
within-group variation and between-group variation, i. e. how diverse the countries
within the regions are. The F-scores confirm our assumption that the between-group
variation is larger than the within-group variation.
Table 1 shows the change in the average support of democracy between 2006 and
2012 on the basis of three indicators. The values are differences in averages of being
either satisfied (score 1) or dissatisfied (score 0). The distinction between satisfied
and dissatisfied is based on the median score. Negative signs indicate that there is
a decrease in satisfaction. Overall the table shows that there is no general decrease
in satisfaction as is often assumed in the literature.
Table 1 shows that the specific support has been strengthened in all regions except
in the South. The South has been most affected by the economic crisis (H1) since
the satisfaction has dropped from 0.56 to 0.27. A similar pattern is shown in case
of the satisfaction with government. The indicator of diffuse support, institutional
trust, shows a small rise, except in Southern Europe where it drops from 0.52 to
0.39. These results confirm hypothesis 3 which assumes that the Great Recession
will lead to lower levels of trust, in particular in countries with that are hit hard by
the crisis and/or with a lean welfare system.
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There are significant regional differences in the satisfaction with government
and democracy. In the Nordic countries the satisfaction is around 0.70 to 0.80.
This situation is exceptional. The relatively high level of social welfare is likely to
contribute to this. In the Liberal countries the degree of satisfaction is much lower,
namely around 0.50. There is not much increase in satisfaction in these countries.
In the continental countries the levels of satisfaction are similar to those in liberal
countries and they are also rising. Within this region there is a high degree of
satisfaction with government in Switzerland and a low level of satisfaction in France.
Apparently the satisfaction with governments in majoritarian systems (France, UK)
is relatively low. In Southern Europe the satisfaction is at the lowest level and also
the degree of trust is relatively low in 2012. This regional pattern indicates that the
depth of the economic crisis plays an important role in the degree of satisfaction
in combination with the external intervention by the EU and the IMF which has
taken place (to varying degrees) in Southern European countries. The observation
by Cordero and Simón (2016) that, as a reaction to these interventions, there is a rise
in satisfaction with national democracy in this region is not confirmed.
In Eastern Europe the satisfaction with government and democracy in 2006 is
much lower than in Southern Europe, but in 2012 it has become higher. The trust in
Eastern Europe is lower than in Southern Europe in both years. These patterns reveal
that both the change and the degree of satisfaction and trust are related to regional
variations in the intensity of the economic crisis, the type of welfare state and the
phase of democratic development (Lijphart 2012). Although there is ample variation
within the regions (as is specified in Online Appendix 1), the differences between
the regions outweigh the differences within the regions (which is indicated by the
F-statistic). In 2006 the between-group variation is rather low and barely significant.
In 2012 the between-group variation has increased significantly. This means that
the differences between the regions in the degree of satisfaction and trust have
become more stronger. The main cause of these increased differences is Southern
Europe that has encountered a dramatic decrease in satisfaction with democracy and
government and of institutional trust. Finally Table 1 confirms Lipset’s expectation
that specific support is more volatile than diffuse support as the changes in diffuse
support between 2006 and 2012 are relatively low compared to the changes in
specific support.
In general, the patterned variations in Table 1 reveal that the type of welfare
regime matters for the degree of satisfaction with government and democracy (H5).
We may roughly distinguish between two groups, namely the South and East of
Europe in which the levels of trust and satisfaction are lowest (in particular in 2012)
and Nordic and Continental regions where these levels are relatively high (both
in 2006 and in 2012). Southern Europe is unique in the severity of the economic
crisis, whereas Eastern Europe witnesses an exceptional low level of trust among
its citizens. In the scholarly literature the low levels of trust in Eastern Europe are
linked to the presence of corruption and the relatively short duration of democratic
development. Additional analysis (reported in Online Appendix 2) shows that in
Eastern countries the lowly educated have (on average) nearly as much trust as the
highly educated and the decline of trust of this group is lower than in case of the
higher educated. Hence, in case of Eastern Europe having more knowledge of the
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system coincides with having less trust. In this respect Eastern Europe differs from
the other regions. One explanation might be that most Eastern European democracies
are still developing so that their deficiencies and inequalities are obvious for the
highly educated observer (Schäfer 2013).
Table 1 confirms our central argument that there are regional differences in the
degree and direction of change in dissatisfaction and trust. If we examine these
trends on a year by year basis (Online Appendix 3) it turns out that the increase
of dissatisfaction often started well before the Great Recession. This indicates that
it is not the crisis that leads to distrust or disaffection, but the different socio-
economic and institutional conditions in the European regions lead to systemic
differences in the satisfaction with and trust in democracy. Most prominent are the
differences in welfare statism and democratic performance. If countries are hit by
the crisis, but they can cope with the consequences using social safety nets and by
means of accountable policy measures, the effects on satisfaction are weak or even
absent. But if such safety nets are absent or partly inadequate and the accountability
of government is low, the effects of the crisis are felt much stronger and hence
disaffection with democracy will be higher.
Of course, one may wonder which aspects of democracy so many citizens are
negative about. The sixth wave of the ESS has a included a battery on questions about
the degree to which the democratic system is performing well on a number of criteria
like freedom of speech, minority protection, accountability and policy outcomes like
reducing income differences. These items enable us to get more specific information
about which aspects of democracy are underdeveloped according to the respondents.
Of particular importance are income inequality and poverty which affect the degree
to which citizens do trust and support public institutions (Anderson and Singer
2008). A simple descriptive analysis (reported in Online Appendix 4) turns out
that economic government policies (i. e. reducing income inequality and fighting
poverty) in this respect are regarded by 54% of the citizens as being very important
for democracy in general. There are significant regional differences in this respect.
In Southern and Eastern Europe 67% of the respondents who are dissatisfied with
government find this important, whereas in Western and Northern Europe this is only
51%. In case of the respondents that are satisfied with government these percentages
are 58% and 42% respectively. Similar patterns do also apply to satisfaction with
democracy which is also lower in case of respondents that find it important that
government fights poverty and reduce income inequality.
The results so far indicate that the main problem that most respondents have with
the functioning of democracy concerns the lack of accountability (input-related) and
the poor performance on achieving equality, in particular the degree to which the
government protects all citizens against poverty (output-related). Thomassen (2015)
has accounted for this pattern by claiming that the minority of highly educated
citizens care most about input whereas the majority of low educated citizens care
more about output. This pattern is partly confirmed if we compare the lowly educated
with the highly educated on items that are input-related and items that are output-
related. It turns out that the lowly educated are less satisfied with the output features
of democracy. An example is this item: “In country the government protects all
citizens against poverty” with a mean score 3.96 for lowly educated and 4.44 for
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highly educated (a higher score indicates more satisfaction). The highly educated
are less satisfied with the input features which is indicated for example by this
item: “In country national elections are free and fair” with a mean score of 2.60
for lowly educated and 2.27 for highly educated. However, the group differences in
both examples are rather small. This is an indication that the fear of some scolars,
like in the debate on the relationship between democracy and capitalism (Merkel
2014), that the Great recession has led to a larger divide between social strata and
their satisfaction with democracy is not fully justified.
5 Multi-level analysis
The explorative analysis has described the variations in the support of democracy.
The next step is to explore the causal connections between support of democracy
on the one hand and some potential determinants that have been discussed in the
theoretical section. The focus will be on whether the change in economic growth
(due to the economic crisis) has affected the support of democracy.
Fig. 2 shows the relationship between the change in GDP in the period 2007–2015
and the degree of satisfaction with democracy for all countries within each welfare
regime. The pattern indicates that the level of satisfaction with democracy is not
affected by economic growth (r = 0.11, p = 0.630, n = 21). How economic growth
impacts on satisfaction mainly depends on the type of welfare state. A decline of
economic growth solely leads to less support of democracy in case of particular
welfare regimes. Economic decline (i. e. a score lower than zero) corresponds with
a high level of satisfaction in Nordic countries and with a low level of democratic
support in Southern and Eastern countries. A similar pattern also applies to economic
growth. A high level of economic growth (i. e. a score higher than zero) coincides
Fig. 2 The relationship between
satisfaction with democracy (Y)
and change in GDP per capita
(X) per country and type of
welfare regime
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with a low level of satisfaction in Eastern Europe and with a high level of democratic
support in Switzerland. Although there is some variation within the regions, the
main pattern shows that the welfare regime moderates the impact of the economic
recession on satisfaction. This effect goes in two directions: an economic decline
does not translate into less satisfaction (like in the Nordic countries) and an economic
growth does not lead to more satisfaction (like in the Eastern countries). The rationale
is that economic growth solely leads to more social and economic welfare for all
citizens if the welfare regime effectively redistributes wealth. If the regime lacks
the capabilities to do this, economic growth will not benefit the mass public that
consequently will not express more support for the democracy that they live in.
Economic decline will mainly lead to less support for democracy if the welfare
regime is not capable to compensate for the economic losses by means of social
transfers and services. If there is economic decline and the welfare regime is able to
offer adequate social protection to all citizens, the support for democracy will not
be affected by the economic problems or will even increase. In sum, the relationship
between economic tide and support of democracy depends on the type of welfare
regime. The great recession did erode the support of democracy in case of lean
welfare regimes that were not capable to compensate the citizens for the financial
losses.
Until now the explorative analysis has shown the patterned variations in the de-
pendent variables, i. e. the levels of trust and satisfaction with democracy. In the
following analysis we will combine them into a multi-level model that is used to
assess the causal impact of the relevant independent variables in order to explain
these patterned variations. Most existing approaches predict that on the demand side,
individual characteristics (such as education, age, life satisfaction) do affect individ-
ual level democratic orientations. In addition, on the supply side, several contextual
level factors also have an important effect on these orientations, in particular the type
of welfare regime, the external intervention into the economy and EMU-member-
ship. The models involve measurement at two distinct levels: the first level includes
a sample of individual respondents which is nested within a second regional level.
The models in this study use restricted maximum likelihood techniques (REML) to
estimate direct and cross level effects (Goldstein 1995). This technique produces
similar results as the ML technique (Maximum Likelihood). In hierarchical linear
models, as is customary, all independent variables were centered, by subtracting
the grand mean (which becomes zero). The standardized independent variables all
have a standard deviation of 1.0. The independent variables were treated as fixed
components, reflecting the weighted average for the slope across all groups, while
country was treated as a random component, capturing the national variability in the
slope. The strength of the beta coefficients (slopes) can be interpreted intuitively as
how much change in the dependent variable is generated by a one percent change
in each independent variable.
The dependent variable in the multi-level model is satisfaction with democracy
(Table 2). The same model has been applied to satisfaction with government which
yields similar results. This is an indication that the used model is robust, i. e. the
results will not change if the dependent variable is operationalised differently. The
most commonly used variables at the individual level have been inserted into the
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Table 2 Multi-level Model of Satisfaction with democracya: Baseline model
Parameter Estimate Std.
Error






Intercept 3.58 1.06 7.02 3.38 0.01 1.07 6.09
Age 0.00 0.00 38,593.59 0.28 0.78 0.00 0.00
Sex [Males] 0.06 0.02 38,589.57 3.09 0.00 0.02 0.10
Education 0.02 0.00 38,595.18 7.31 0.00 0.01 0.02
Coping with income –0.08 0.03 38,593.08 –3.33 0.00 –0.13 –0.03
How satisfied with the
economy
0.46 0.01 38,519.78 90.96 0.00 0.45 0.47
How satisfied with life 0.16 0.01 38,593.40 31.06 0.00 0.15 0.17
Unemployment rate 0.09 0.06 6.99 1.47 0.18 –0.05 0.23
Bailout 1.01 0.97 7.02 1.04 0.33 –1.28 3.31
Membership of EMU 0.27 0.28 6.98 0.97 0.37 –0.40 0.94
The degree of consensus
democracy
0.13 0.13 6.97 0.97 0.37 –0.19 0.44
Change in GDP –0.02 0.02 6.99 –1.01 0.34 –0.06 0.02
Welfare regime: Nordic 1.20 0.80 6.99 1.51 0.18 –0.68 3.09
Welfare regime: Liberal –0.02 1.73 7.00 –0.01 0.99 –4.10 4.07
Welfare regime: Conti-
nental
1.01 0.39 6.99 2.63 0.03 0.10 1.93
Welfare regime: South-
ern
4.43 3.04 6.99 1.46 0.19 –2.75 11.61
Welfare regime: Eastern 0b 0.00 – – – – –
Interaction effect: Wel-
fare regime: Nordic *
Change in GDP
0.02 0.07 6.99 0.29 0.78 –0.15 0.20
Interaction effect: Wel-
fare regime: Liberal *
Change in GDP
–0.11 0.15 7.01 –0.74 0.49 –0.46 0.24
Interaction effect: Wel-
fare regime: Continen-
tal * Change in GDP
0.02 0.02 7.00 0.99 0.35 –0.03 0.07
Interaction effect: Wel-
fare regime: Southern *
Change in GDP
0.23 0.15 6.99 1.53 0.17 –0.12 0.58
Interaction effect: Wel-
fare regime: Eastern *
Change in GDP
0b 0.00 – – – – –
Source: ESS (2012). See the Appendix for the explanation of the variables. Information criteria: –2 Re-
stricted Log Likelihood = 158,706.004; Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) = 158,710.004; Hurvich and
Tsai’s Criterion (AICC) = 158,710.004; Bozdogan’s Criterion (CAIC) = 158,729.126; Schwarz’s Bayesian
Criterion (BIC) = 158,727.126
N = 22 countries
aDependent Variable: How satisfied with the way democracy works in country
bThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant
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multivariate model as controls: age, gender, years of education and income (Ander-
son and Guillory 1997; Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). Some previous research
shows that older, highly educated and wealthier citizens are more positive about
democracy. Other researchers do not find consistent empirical evidence that demo-
graphic and social status variables really matter (Anderson and Guillory 1997). The
results of our analysis are mixed. Respondents that are not satisfied with government
are on average lower educated. Sex is significant: females are slightly more satisfied
than males. Age is not significant.
Included in the table are satisfaction with the present state of the economy, coping
with income and satisfaction with life as their causal impact is highly relevant for the
answer to the research question. Satisfaction with the economy is the most important
determinant of the satisfaction with democracy. This is an important finding as it
confirms the Lipset-thesis (Lipset 1959) that there is an intrinsic relationship between
economy and democracy. Satisfaction with life also matters since more satisfaction
with the living conditions enhances the satisfaction with democracy.
At the country level a mix of economic and institutional variables is included. At
the economic level the unemployment rate (unempc) is included in the model, but
this indicator does not yield a significant result. The same goes for economic growth
(GDPCH) that does not yield a significant effect. Political-institutional structures
matter as they mediate the relationship between a person’s socio-economic status
and his or her satisfaction with the way the system works. Several researchers have
claimed that citizens in consensual systems display higher levels of satisfaction with
the way democracy works than citizens with a similar socio-economic position in
systems with majoritarian characteristics (Lijphart 2012). The reason is that inclu-
sive systems that take into account the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups
invoke a higher level of satisfaction among the population. Majoritarian systems that
are based on the “winner takes all” principle invoke dissatisfaction among the losers
of the competition. On this basis it is expected that in consensus systems there is
a higher level of satisfaction with democracy and government than in majoritarian
systems. We use the indicator which is conceptualized by Lijphart (2012) and oper-
ationalized by Armingeon et al. (2016). This variable turns out to be not significant.
Hence, consensual institutions do not enhance satisfaction with democracy. This is
not very surprising as Lijphart himself also found very weak relationships between
consensus democracy and satisfaction by means of bi-variate correlations.
Three additional institutional variables that figure prominently in the literature
are included in the baseline model. The first variable is whether countries are bailed
out or not. It is expected that dissatisfaction with democracy is higher in bailed-
out countries due to the inability of these countries to cope with the effects of the
economic crisis. The second variable is the membership of the European Monetary
Union (EMU). Armingeon et al. (2016) have found that the austerity measures
imposed on countries in the Eurozone’s periphery has weakened the support of
democracy of a majority of citizens in crisis countries. Finally, the welfare regime
is included. Welfare regime enters the equation as a number of dummy variables.
Only the continental group yields significant results. In addition, the interaction
effects between welfare regime and economic growth do not yield significant effects.
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Table 3 Multi-level Model of Satisfaction with democracya: Final model
Parameter Estimate Std.
Error






Intercept 4.86 0.12 17.36 40.95 0.00 4.61 5.11
Sex [Males] 0.06 0.02 40,569.81 3.11 0.00 0.02 0.10
Education 0.02 0.00 40,564.06 7.51 0.00 0.01 0.02
Coping with income –0.08 0.02 40,575.67 –3.40 0.00 –0.13 –0.03
How satisfied with the
economy
0.46 0.00 40,062.18 93.62 0.00 0.45 0.47
How satisfied with life 0.16 0.00 40,567.45 31.87 0.00 0.15 0.17
Welfare regime: Nordic 0.93 0.20 17.13 4.56 0.00 0.50 1.36
Welfare regime: Liberal 0.97 0.26 16.86 3.67 0.00 0.41 1.52
Welfare regime: Conti-
nental
0.63 0.19 17.00 3.30 0.00 0.23 1.03
Welfare regime: South-
ern
0.06 0.23 17.12 0.28 0.78 –0.41 0.54
Welfare regime: Eastern 0b 0.00 – – – – –
Source: ESS (2012). See the Appendix for the explanation of the variables. Information criteria: –2 Re-
stricted Log Likelihood = 166,583.034; Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) = 166,587.034; Hurvich and
Tsai’s Criterion (AICC) = 166,587.035; Bozdogan’s Criterion (CAIC) = 166,606.25; Schwarz’s Bayesian
Criterion (BIC) = 166,604.257.
N = 22 countries
aDependent Variable: How satisfied with the way democracy works in country
bThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant
Hence, the preliminary results indicate that the variables at the individual level have
the strongest impact on the degree to which citizens are dissatisfied with democracy.
The final model that is presented in Table 3 shows the results after removing the
variables with insignificant effects step-by-step starting with the most insignificant
ones. After removing these variables only one variable remains that has a significant
effect, namely welfare regime. This outcome confirms our main hypothesis that
higher developed welfare regimes are associated with higher levels of satisfaction
with democracy. The only welfare regime that is insignificant results is Southern
Europe. This outcome indicates that the degree of satisfaction in these countries
varies compared to the reference group (which is Eastern Europe). This is also
indicated by Fig. 2 which shows that the degree to which citizens in Southern
European countries are satisfied, compared with inhabitants of Eastern countries,
varies per country. This is a sharp contrast with the other welfare regimes which
uniformly show higher levels of satisfaction than the Eastern countries. This result
underlines the distinctiveness of the countries in Southern Europe compared to the
countries in the Continental group.
All in all, the outcomes of the multi-level regression confirm the results of the
explorative analysis. At the individual level the satisfaction with the economy is the
most important determinant of the satisfaction with democracy. At the contextual
level the welfare regime is the only statistically relevant factor. In addition, there
are clear regional implications of the findings. The countries in the regions that are
K
When and where did the great recession erode the support of democracy? 99
not hit hard by the crisis and/or were not confronted with a bail-out, do also show
the highest levels of satisfaction with democracy compared with countries that were
confronted with these problems.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that the Great Recession did not lead to a legitimacy crisis of
European democracies and that the diffuse support of democracy remains high in
most regions. However, in countries where the economic crisis did strike hard, the
support of democracy has been weakened dramatically. This outcome takes a middle
position between two opposite outcomes in the ongoing academic debate on the
support of democracy. On the one hand, some researchers like Dalton (2011) and
Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) claim that the degree of satisfaction with democracy
has declined across the whole of Europe. On the other hand, several other researchers
have found no empirical evidence that the support of democracy as a core value has
declined across Europe. They claim that merely the specific support has decreased
in some countries (Norris 2011; Thomassen 2015).
Both positions regarding the increase or decrease of support of and satisfaction
with democracy are in need of more nuance by taking into account the role of
welfare regimes which are clustered in regions which share not only a type of
welfare state, but also history, culture, state-society relations, phase of democratic
development, degree of international vulnerability and above all a similar level of
socio economic welfare. This context shapes the expectations that citizens have
about the development of both their own income and the national socio economic
welfare. Many existing research assumes a uniform European context that shows
either increasing or decreasing levels of satisfaction with democracy. Our research
has shown that the effects of the economic crisis on the support of democracy
are moderated by the type of welfare state. The dissatisfaction with democracy is
lower in countries in which the welfare regime is well equipped to cope with the
consequences of the economic crisis.
Most of the hypothesised relationships are confirmed. The research shows that
specific support is more affected by the economic crisis than diffuse support which is
demonstrated by the moderate change in institutional trust (H1 and H2). On a more
disaggregated level the Great Recession did to lower levels of trust, in particular of
the lower educated and in countries with that are hit hard by the crisis (H3). Countries
that were confronted with austerity measures that were imposed by external actors
witness a drop in the support of national democracy and not an increase of this
support (H4). The type of welfare state has had a moderating effect on the degree to
which citizens have been satisfied with democracy during the Great Recession (H5).
A declining economic growth did not lead to less support of democracy in countries
with a highly developed welfare state, but it did have this effect in countries with
lean welfare states.
Although the empirical trends show no overall decrease of support of democracy
across the whole of Europe, but there are significant regional differences that have to
be taken into account. In Southern Europe we find a significant increase in citizens
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that is dissatisfied with democracy and its performance. In Anglo-Saxon Europe we
see a similar development but to a lesser degree. The severity of the economic and
financial crisis has a significant impact on the support of democracy.
In addition to this main finding, the research has empirically demonstrated the
dual character of legitimacy, namely the difference between specific and diffuse
support of democracy. The trends and variations in both types of satisfaction with
democracy indicate an interesting paradox: notwithstanding the apparent low levels
of specific support, the overall trust in representative democracy as a regime remains
intact. Given the high degree to which the economic crisis has affected the level of
social and economic welfare, the public acceptance and adherence to the democratic
systems is surprising. This research has also shown that the Great Recession has
lowered the diffuse support of democracy in Southern Europe which is the region
that has been hit hard by the Great Recession.
The societal implications of these results are that citizens in European regions
live in different socio-economic circumstances which affect their view on what
the EU has to offer them. These regional differences may hamper the process of
European integration because they strengthen existing socio economic and cultural
cleavages in Europe. In addition, in some countries the EU institutions are blamed
for the economic crisis and/or more integration is seen as a threat to the national
autonomy and level of economic welfare. This sentiment may strengthen the call
for renationalisation and hamper the process of European integration. This new
development may (in the long run) slow down the recovery of the economic crisis
and strengthen the discontent with both the national and European democracy. In
order to cope with these regional differences, they have to be taken (more) serious
in policy-making and research.
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Appendix: Variables and operationalisation
How satisfied with the way democracy works in country (stfdem): And on the whole, how satisfied are
you with the way democracy works in [country]?
How satisfied with the national government (stfgov): Now thinking about the [country] government, how
satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?
Institutional Trust is measured by the mean of the values on three variables: Using this card, please tell
me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out: Trust in Parlia-
ment, Trust in the legal system and trust in the police
Age: Age of respondent, calculated (agec). Source: ESS 2012
Sex: 0 = male, 1 = female. Source: ESS 2012
Education: Years of full-time education completed (eduyrs). Source: ESS 2012
Coping with Income: Living comfortably or coping on present income (copeinc). Source: ESS 2012
How satisfied with present state of economy in country (stfecoc): On the whole how satisfied are you
with the present state of the economy in [country]?
How satisfied with life as a whole (stflifec): All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as
a whole nowadays? Please answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means
extremely satisfied
Unemployment rate, % of civilian labour force. Source: Armingeon, Klaus, Christian Isler, Laura
Knöpfel, David Weisstanner and Sarah Engler. 2015. Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2013. Bern:
Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. URL: http://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data#CPDS
(assessed 17 May 2016). (Unempc)
Bailout: whether a country is bailed out. Included bailed out countries are Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain
Membership of EMU (emu)
The degree of consensus democracy is based on the first parties-executives dimension which is proposed
by Lijphart (2012) (variable Lfirstpc). The operationalisation is explained in an Appendix in the CPDS-
codebook called “Notes concerning the variables for consensus democracy”. The variable is composed
of the moving averages of 10 years of four indices: The number of effective parties in parliament (eff-
par_leg), the absence of minimal winning and single-party majority cabinets, the proportionality of elec-
toral systems and a measure for cabinet dominance. Source: Armingeon, Klaus, Christian Isler, Laura
Knöpfel, David Weisstanner and Sarah Engler. 2015. Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2013. Bern:
Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. URL: http://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data#CPDS
(assessed 17 May 2016)
Change in GDP per capita (GDPCH). Source: World Bank
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